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BILLIONAIRE BOYS' CLUB: BILLIONAIRES
BY CRIME?
I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it.
-Voltaire
I. INTRODUCTION
When high stakes crimes are committed, television and movie op-
portunists are often the ones to "cash-in" by cinematically exploiting the
unfortunate situation for an eager public. The perpetrator is defenseless
against these Hollywood looters; unless he can enjoin their actions.
However uncomfortable we may feel by the showing of these movies, a
prior restraint in the fair trial context should never be allowed since it
essentially cuts off the press and the public from their first amendment
guarantees. In addition, alternatives to prior restraint effectively guard
the defendant's valuable right to an impartial jury trial.
Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co. ' ("Hunt") raises the issue of
whether prior restraints on freedom of the press are ever appropriate. In
Hunt, the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") wanted to broad-
cast a made-for-television movie based on the bizarre events involving
the charismatic leader of the Billionaire Boys Club, Joe Hunt, who was
already convicted of killing one man at the time of the broadcast. Joe
Hunt wanted to thwart the airing of the movie because he felt that broad-
casting it would prejudice the jury in his trial for the killing of a second
man, thus denying him his constitutional right to a fair trial. The district
court denied Hunt's request for both a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction.2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, and NBC aired the program as scheduled.3
This note examines the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court decisions involving prior restraints in light
of Hunt, and recommends that prior restraints in the fair trial context
should be declared per se unconstitutional.
II. CASE FACTS
Joe Hunt sought to enjoin NBC and I.T.C. Productions ("ITC")
1. 872 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 290.
3. Id.
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from televising the docudrama Billionaire Boys Club on November 8 and
9, 1987. The television movie depicts Hunt, the club's founder and
leader, plotting and participating in the murders of Ronald Levin and
Hedayat Eslaminia,5 both for financial gain.6 At the time of Hunt's ac-
tion for injunctive relief in October 1987, he had already been convicted
of the murder of Levin, and was awaiting trial for the Eslaminia murder.7
Hunt argued that airing the docudrama would affect both his pending
Eslaminia murder trial and any new trial for Levin's murder, if Hunt's
conviction was overturned on appeal.8 The NBC docudrama portrayed
Hunt's motive for murdering both these men as being for profit, and il-
lustrated how Hunt's megalomaniacal personality and behavior led to
the conclusion that he committed these murders.9
The district court denied Hunt's application for a temporary re-
straining order and preliminary injunction against both NBC and the
producer of the docudrama, ITC. ° Although the movie had already
been aired once, the Ninth Circuit heard the case because the movie
could be rebroadcast."
A. The Sordid Details
Hunt's objection to the broadcast of the television movie needs to be
viewed against the background of the criminal case. BBC Consolidated,
Inc., 2 known by its members as the Billionaire Boys Club ("BBC"), was
comprised of well-educated young men from affluent families in the Los
Angeles area who revered the club's leader and founder Joe Hunt.'
3
Hunt attended the Harvard School in the 1970s, a prestigious boys'
school in Studio City, California.' 4 Hunt claimed that he had graduated
4. Id.
5. Eslaminia was a former member of the Shah of Iran's cabinet. McGarry, Trial by TV,
CAL. LAW., May 1988, at 31. McGarry was one of the attorneys for Joe Hunt. Id.
6. Hunt, 872 F.2d at 291.
7. Id. at 290. Hunt was convicted of Levin's murder in Los Angeles, California. Id.
Hunt is awaiting trial for Eslaminia's murder in San Mateo County, California and is acting as
his own attorney. Murderer Becomes Lawyer in 2nd Trial, Sacramento Bee, Dec. 28, 1989, at
B5.
8. Hunt, 872 F.2d at 291.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 290.
11. Id. at 291. NBC acknowledged that the movie could be repeated, and in fact, it was in
July 1989. L.A. Times, July 29, 1989, § 5, at 1, col. 4.
12. The name was taken from the initials of the Bombay Bicycle Club, a Chicago bar
frequented by Joe Hunt. High-Life 'Club' Leads Rich Boys Down a Dark Path, L.A. Times,
Nov. 2, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3.
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from the University of Southern California and had become a successful
trader in the Chicago commodities market.'" In reality, Hunt did not
graduate from the University of Southern California, botched most of his
investments, and was expelled from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 6
When he returned to Los Angeles, he met up with his old high school
friends, including twins Tom and Dave May (of the May Co.) and Dean
Karny, all of whom would become BBC members and would later testify
against their former leader. 7 Hunt presented to his friends his visionary
plan for a new kind of company-"an organization that would combine
business and pleasure, run by young men who shared ideas, profits and
even living quarters."' 8
The resulting business organization, BBC Consolidated, operated
out of chic West Hollywood offices.' 9 The BBC empire included subsidi-
aries that were involved in a myriad of business ventures with items such
as milling machines, imported cars, trading funds and even a fire retard-
ant product.2 ° The BBC members were not salaried employees but par-
ticipants in a joint venture. 21  Hunt convinced them that by
subordinating themselves and their interests in BBC Consolidated in
favor of him and the corporation, they would all become financially suc-
cessful.22 Over time, thirty young men joined the BBC, all taken in by
Hunt's rhetoric and charisma.23
The business organization and its members were guided by what
Hunt termed "paradox philosophy."24 Hunt defined paradox philosophy
as a system of situational ethics in which good and bad were relative
terms, interchangeable depending on the circumstances.25 One member
said that he became so warped by Hunt and his use of this philosophy
that he "started being less obligated to follow rules and doing more what
was acceptable under the circumstances.",
26
The BBC members lived well, but their investments were not as
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 2, at 3. In those days Hunt, the son of a San Fernando
Valley small businessman, attended Harvard School on a scholarship and used his original




21. L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, § 2, at 3.
22. Id.
23. L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 2, at 3.
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profitable as hoped. As a result, the BBC used money from new inves-
tors to pay off the old ones, a procedure known as the Ponzi scheme.27
By early 1984, the BBC had lost $900,000, much of it money from the
members' parents.2" By June of 1984, the BBC was running out of
money.29
At that crucial point, Ron Levin, a forty-two year old journalist and
self-admitted con artist, entered the picture. 30 Levin agreed to put five
million dollars in a brokerage house account and to let Hunt, a self-pro-
claimed genius at commodities, trade it; they would split the profit.31
Levin, however, was running his own scheme. Keeping Hunt in the
dark, Levin persuaded the brokerage company that he was preparing a
documentary about commodities trading, and that while none of the or-
ders would actually be executed, the financial advisor he was bringing in
should not be told so he would make real decisions.32 Hunt surprisingly
parlayed the five million into thirteen million, but when he asked for his
share-four million-Levin told Hunt that it had all been just a game.33
Not surprisingly, Hunt was furious.
34
Shortly thereafter, Hunt learned that Levin was planning to leave
for New York. Hunt decided to use this opportunity to kill Levin, but
not before forcing him, at gunpoint, to sign certain papers, including a
check for a large sum of money. 35 Hunt prepared a detailed list of the
procedure he and his bodyguard Jim Pittman would use at Levin's
house.36
The information about the planning of Levin's murder was provided
by Dean Karny, a BBC ringleader who was given immunity for his testi-
mony and was placed in the California Witness Protection Program.37
At Hunt's preliminary hearing, Karny testified that on June 7, 1984,
Hunt came into his bedroom at the deluxe Wilshire Boulevard condo-









36. Id. The lists on seven pages of yellow legal paper in Hunt's handwriting were headed
AT LEVIN'S TO DO and then listed items including: "close blinds," "scan for tape recorder,"
"tape mouth," "put gloves on," "handcuff," "explain situation," "kill dog." L.A. Times, Feb.
3, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. 1. These lists, along with the testimony of Dean Karny, were the key
pieces of evidence used to convict Joe Hunt. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
37. L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 2, at 3.
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minium they shared, waving a check for $1.5 million drawn on Levin's
Swiss bank account.38 Hunt told Karny "that he had killed Ron Levin"
and had dumped the body in a deserted canyon. 39 Later, Hunt assem-
bled the inner circle of the BBC, nine of his most trusted cohorts, and
announced that he and Jim Pittman had killed Ron Levin. 40
A month later, the BBC's cold-blooded desperation for money led
some members to formulate a plan to kidnap and torture Hedayat Es-
laminia, the father of BBC member Reza Eslaminia. 4' They plotted to
force the elder Eslaminia to transfer his assets, estimated at over $30
million, to his son or BBC businesses, and then to kill him.42 To carry
out this scheme, Karny testified that he, Hunt, Ben Dosti, Pittman and
Reza Eslaminia met in San Francisco.4 3 Dressed as deliverymen, they
delivered a trunk to the Eslaminia estate, administered chloroform to
Mr. Eslaminia, and then beat him into submission." The group finally
stuffed Eslaminia in the trunk for the trip back to Los Angeles, where he
was to be kept in the basement of a rented house until he signed the
appropriate papers.45 Hedayat Eslaminia never made it to Los Angeles.
At the penalty phase of Hunt's trial for Levin's murder, Karny testified
that he had punched air holes in the trunk but had also taped over them
each time Eslaminia started making noises.46 Hunt, who was driving the
truck at the time, ordered Karny to check on Eslaminia so Karny opened
the trunk.47 Karny thought the man was breathing, but a few minutes
later confirmed that Eslaminia was dead.48 The body was dumped in
Soledad Canyon in the Angeles National Forest and was later identified
through dental records.4 9
Hunt was arrested with Pittman in October of 1984 in connection
with Levin's death, and both men were charged with Eslaminia's murder
in December of that year. ° Hunt's trial for the Eslaminia murder is still
38. Id. The check bounced. Id. at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. (testimony of Dean Karny).





46. Slow Death in a Trunk Described to Hunt Jury, L.A. Times, May 20, 1987, § 2, at 6,
col. 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. Hunt's defense co-counsel Richard Chier had only one question for Karny at this
point: "At the time [Eslaminia] died, his life was in your hands, wasn't it?" Id.
49. L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 2, at 3, col. 1. Karny led authorities to the spot. Levin's
remains are thought to be in the same area. Id.
50. Id. Hunt had been previously arrested in September of 1984 but released for lack of
1990]
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pending.5
Since Levin's body was never found, much of what happened within
the BBC remains shrouded in mystery and speculation.52 Soon after
Hunt was arrested, members began to "cash-in" on their original invest-
ment by selling the rights to their life stories. A book has been published
on the events, 53 and Hunt plans to tell his side of the story in a feature
film to balance the NBC miniseries.54
B. Objections to the Broadcast
Hunt had two main objections to the NBC docudrama. First, Hunt
maintained that the docudrama did not accurately portray the events re-
evidence. Ben Dosti and Reza Eslaminia were reported to be biding out in Europe, searching
for the elder Eslaminia's assets. They were arrested in 1985 when they returned to the United
States and tried to pick up false passports. Ben Dosti is the son of a L.A. Times food critic.
Id. Both men were convicted and sentenced on May 10, 1988 to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for their roles in Eslaminia's death. L.A. Times, May 11, 1988, § 2, at 1,
col. 5.
51. See supra note 7.
52. L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 1. Hunt's bail was paid by the father of his
former girlfriend, film and music producer Bobby Roberts. Hunt resided at Roberts' Bel-Air
home during the trial. Roberts also hired defense attorney Arthur Barens who was assisted by
Chier. Previously, Barens had unsuccessfully defended Marvin Pancoast, convicted in 1984 of
the murder of Vicki Morgan, the mistress of Alfred Bloomingdale. Id.
The defense position throughout the trial was that Hunt did make those lists on yellow
legal paper and had planned to kill Levin, but that Levin disappeared before Hunt could exe-
cute his plan. The defense tried to show that Levin had a good reason for leaving town, as he
was facing charges of grand theft for receiving one million dollars in stolen computer goods.
Id. The defense maintained Hunt had told the BBC members that he had killed Levin to
manipulate BBC members and bind them together in a scheme that was spinning out of con-
trol and to reassure the boys that the money Levin owed to the BBC was on its way. The
defense also tried to show that BBC members who testified against Hunt were out for revenge
for their financial losses. Id. Tom and Dave May, for example, who together lost $180,000
testified against Hunt. L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. 1. They partially recouped
their losses when they cooperated with ITC's producing of the miniseries and were paid
$65,000. Evan Dicker, grandson of the founder of the tony Los Angeles law firm of Dicker &
Dicker, was also paid an undisclosed fee for his cooperation. L.A. Times, Nov 2, 1987, § 6, at
1, col. 1.
Hunt was originally scheduled to testify in his own defense, but at the last minute, Barens
rested. Thus, the defense then had to rely on the testimony of Hunt's former girlfriend and her
mother who both said that Hunt was home getting ready for bed at the time he and Pittman
were supposed to have shot Levin. In addition, an Arizona couple testified that they had seen
a man late in 1986 who resembled Levin. New Tactic Stuns Trial: Hunt Will Not Testify, L.A.
Times, Apr. 7, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. 6. Many reports of Levin spottings were discounted
throughout the trial. See BBC Jury Warned To Disregard Reports that Victim is Alive, L.A.
Times, Apr. 22, 1987, § 2, at 6, col. 5.
53. The docudrama was based on the book The Pied Piper of Beverly Hills by Sue Horton.
L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1987, § 6, at 10.
54. L.A. Times, July 29, 1989, § 5, at 10. Screenwriter Peter Brooke and producer Tim
Scott are developing this film in cooperation with Hunt. Id.
[V/ol. 10
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counted above." Lois Timnick, the Los Angeles Times reporter assigned
to cover Hunt's trial, illustrated some of the discrepancies between the
film version of the events and the real-life version.56 Timnick noted that
key witness Dean Karny is portrayed in the film as a conscience-stricken
youth who was innocently drawn into the BBC by the charismatic Hunt,
while during the trial "he came across as a wimpy clone of Hunt who
finally went to the police to save his own skin.""7 In the movie, Hunt's
bodyguard Jim Pittman confesses that he helped to kidnap Eslaminia,
which his attorney maintains is untrue. 8 Finally, the movie gives the
impression that the police investigating the murders were all bungling
cops and that the murders were solved by Tom and Dave May59 and Jeff
Raymond' when, in fact, respected Beverly Hills Police Detective Les
Zoeller and investigators in Northern California were the real-life
heroes.61
While these discrepancies may not be vital to Hunt's case, the differ-
ences between real fact and film fact illustrate that NBC was not con-
cerned about the true story. Lois Timnick considered the movie "smaller
than life, a pale and sometimes misleading imitation of reality, slanted
toward the prosecution's view."'62 She commented that the docudrama
"ignored-almost entirely-the defense version of what happened, which
may explain why Hunt's Los Angeles attorney, Arthur Barens, was not
invited to the preview screening .... Such one-sided courtroom drama
may be fine in fiction, but it appears ill-placed in a purportedly factual
account of a real-life story that is still being played out in the courts."
63
Howard Rosenberg, who reviewed the docudrama for the Los Ange-
les Times, thought the movie convinced viewers that Hunt, Jim Pittman,
Reza Eslaminia and Ben Dosti were all guilty. 64 "It's hard to make a
55. Brief of Appellant Joe Hunt at 10-12, Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d
289 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-6625).
56. Timnick, What's on the Tube Not Quite the Real Picture, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1987,
§ 6, at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Called Eric and Chris Fairmont in the film. Id.
60. Called Brad Sedgwick in the film. Id.
61. Timnick, What's on the Tube Not Quite the Real Picture, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1987,
§ 6, at 8.
62. Id,. at I.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Rosenberg, The 'Boys Club'and Trial by TV L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1987, § 6, at 1, col.
2. Rosenberg did not give the film rave reviews either. He wrote,
We see indulged snots on the screen-a privileged fraternity of weak, sniveling Leo-
polds and Loebs in designer suits and haircuts-who soon grow tiresome. Except for
Hunt, they are elegantly tailored look-alikes, an almost comical herd in search of a
1990]
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case for NBC airing the 'Billionaire Boys Club' at this time," remarked
Rosenberg. "The argument for postponement, on ethical grounds if not
legal ones, is much stronger."65 District Attorney Fred Wapner, who
prosecuted Hunt in Los Angeles, commented, "The cutting back and
forth from the courtroom to the actual enactment bothered me. You
assume that [what you are seeing is] the true story .... I really think it
is irresponsible to have aired this now while the trials are still going on.
The story is so inherently entertaining that if they had waited and done it
better, it would have been just as interesting two years from now."66
Santa Monica Superior Court Judge Laurence J. Rittenband, who pre-
sided at Hunt's trial, did not object to the film but admitted that "the
public will get a false picture of what happens at a real trial because none
of that testimony about Hunt's character and other alleged crimes...
could ever come up during the guilt phase of a trial the way it did in the
movie.""
Hunt's second objection to the broadcast of the docudrama is that it
interfered with his right to a fair trial.6" Hunt argued that his right to a
fair trial outweighed NBC's first amendment right to broadcast a fiction
film.69 Hunt cited a Second Circuit decision which stated that "[w]hen
the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon Sixth Amendment
rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter."7 ° Hunt con-
tended that NBC's right to broadcast a fiction film was not equal to its
right to broadcast news events; and thus NBC would not be significantly
harmed by an order preventing it from airing Billionaire Boys Club until
after all of Hunt's appeals were exhausted. 7
III. COURT'S HOLDING
The district court held that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent prevented the district court from granting Hunt's motion
for a prior restraint on the exercise of NBC's first amendment rights.72
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of Hunt's motion for
leader, mental sloths who fall for Hunt's line about blasting "through the tyranny
created by mediocre minds." And Hunt himself is pretty much of a bore.
Id. at 31. Hunt was played by actor Judd Nelson. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 31.
66. L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1987, § 6, at 8 (emphasis and insert in original).
67. Id.
68. Brief of Appellant Joe Hunt at 8, Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289
(9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-6625).
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id. at 9 (quoting In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988)).
71. Id. at 11-12.




IV. BACKGROUND: THE DOCTRINE AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINTS
A. Overview
A prior restraint restricts speech or other expression before it is
communicated. 74  By comparison, subsequent punishment, defined as
punishment after publication or after speech, as in libel actions, imposes
a penalty after the expression.75
The first amendment was designed to prevent the federal govern-
ment from imposing prior restraints in any area of expression protected
by the first amendment.76 A prior restraint imposes a harsh consequence
because it restrains speech before there is an adequate determination that
the subject speech or publication is not protected by the first amend-
ment. 77 Additionally, a person disobeying a prior restraint order may
not use the defense that the prior restraint is unconstitutional. 7' This
rule is known as the collateral bar rule, and its application further illus-
trates how a prior restraint suffocates speech. 79 By contrast, in a subse-
quent punishment action, the defense that the speech at issue is protected
by the first amendment is allowed."0
Professor Thomas Emerson summarized the prior restraint doctrine
as follows:
In the first place, the doctrine deals with limitations of form
rather than substance. The issue is not whether the govern-
73. Id.
74. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
75. Id.
76. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-34 (1988). The English Licensing
Act of 1662, which was effective throughout most of the second half of the seventeenth cen-
tury, illustrates prior restraints during the colonial period of American history. That act pro-
hibited the printing of any material without the prior approval of church and state authorities.
Emerson, supra note 74, at 650-51. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
77. TRIBE, supra note 76, at § 12-34.
78. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 552 (1977).
79. Id. at 551. In this Note, mention of the collateral bar rule only serves to show the
strictness of a prior restraint. The Supreme Court has sometimes declined to apply it. TRIBE,
supra note 76, at § 12-35. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (allowing privilege
against self-incrimination to be invoked at contempt hearing for failure to produce evidence);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (permitting first amendment newsgathering defense
to be raised in contempt proceedings for failure to testify). Some lower courts also have re-
stricted its application. See, e.g., In re Timmons, 607 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Halkin,
598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Goldblum v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir.
1979); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers,
Inc., 50 Il. App. 3d 250, 8 11. Dec. 508, 365 N.E.2d 746 (1977).
80. TRIBE, supra note 76, at § 12-35.
1990]
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ment may impose a particular restriction of substance in an
area of public expression, such as forbidding obscenity in news-
papers, but whether it may do so by a particular method, such
as advance screening of newspaper copy. 8' In other words, re-
strictions which could be validly imposed when enforced by
subsequent punishment are, nevertheless, forbidden if at-
tempted by prior restraint. The major considerations underly-
ing the doctrine of prior restraint, therefore, are matters of
administration, techniques of enforcement, methods of opera-
tion, and their effect upon the basic objectives of the first
amendment.
82
B. Near v. Minnesota
The Supreme Court did not invoke the doctrine of prior restraint for
almost 130 years after the first amendment was ratified.83 Then, in 1931,
the Court addressed the doctrine in Near v. Minnesota, 84 a case involving
the application of the Minnesota Gag Law ("Gag Law"). 85 In essence,
the Gag Law allowed the government to enjoin a publication deemed to
be a nuisance. 86 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the periodi-
cal, The Saturday Press, was a nuisance because it had printed malicious,
scandalous and defamatory articles about Jewish people and certain pub-
lic officials, such as the Chief of Police and the County Attorney of Min-
neapolis. 87  Applying the Gag Law, the court issued a permanent
injunction against the publishers of The Saturday Press to prevent future
articles of such nature.88 The publishers appealed.
The United States Supreme Court found that the Minnesota statute
constituted a prior restraint and thus violated the first amendment.89
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes enunciated the doctrine of
prior restraint: "The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a
strong light the general conception that liberty of the press, historically
considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, princi-
pally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or cen-
81. For an example of this type of prior restraint, see Goldblum, infra notes 131 & 135 and
accompanying text.
82. Emerson, supra note 74, at 648.
83. Id. at 652.
84. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 701-02.
87. Id. at 703-04.
88. Id. at 705.
89. Near, 283 U.S. at 723.
[Vol. 10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sorship." 9° The Court also noted that immunity from prior restraint
prefaced the intention of the first amendment. 9'
C. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
1. The Test
The decision in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart92 ("Nebraska
Press") has influenced all prior restraint cases since its inception in 1976.
In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court adopted a three part test that a
defendant must meet when requesting a prior restraint. 9a The defendant
must show: (1) that the pretrial publicity about the case is extensive; (2)
that alternatives to prior restraint94 will not mitigate the harmful effects
of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (3) that a prior restraint would
effectively protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.95 This three-
pronged test must lead to the conclusion that without a prior restraint,
the defendant would be prevented from securing twelve jurors who
could, with proper judicial instructions, render an impartial verdict based
only on the evidence admitted during trial.96 The heavy burden on the
defendant, however, makes this test nearly impossible to meet.
9 7
2. The Decision
In Nebraska Press, a state court judge issued an order preventing the
Nebraska Press Association from publishing or broadcasting accounts of
confessions or admissions made by the accused, Erwin Charles Simants,
or facts "strongly implicative" of the accused in a widely reported mur-
90. Id. at 716.
91. Id. at 717.
92. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
93. Id. at 562.
94. The alternatives to prior restraint include: (a) change of trial venue to a place less
exposed to publicity; (b) postponement of the trial until public attention subsides; (c) specific
voir dire to determine the influence of publicity on a prospective juror; (d) the use of clear and
emphatic jury instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to decide the issues only on evi-
dence presented in open court; (e) sequestration of jurors. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-64.
See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966).
95. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562. The Supreme Court stated that courts reviewing a
prior restraint:
must examine the evidence before the trial judge when the order was entered to de-
termine (a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other meas-
ures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c)
how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger.
Id.
96. Id. at 569.
97. Id. at 541.
1990]
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der of six persons. 98 After unsuccessfully challenging the order, the Ne-
braska Press Association appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the entry of such an order violated
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. 99 The Court refused
to uphold the district court's order, deeming it a prior restraint.'0
Applying the Nebraska Press test, the Court concluded that the ac-
cused Simants could not meet it.1"' First, the Court found that the wide-
spread nature of the publicity might impair the defendant's right to a fair
trial but that this evidence alone would not lead to the conclusion that an
impartial jury could not be impanelled. 102 Secondly, there was no show-
ing that alternatives to prior restraint could not adequately be employed
to insure the defendant a fair trial despite the publicity. °3 Third, the
Court concluded that there was no proof that a prior restraint would
protect the defendant's rights."° In support of this conclusion, the
Court noted that an order for restraint of the press was difficult to draft
because it had to accommodate two needs-the need to protect the de-
fendant's rights as much as possible and the need to restrict the press as
little as possible."15 The Court also pointed out that a trial judge would
have difficulty predicting, in advance of trial,'06 what information would
prejudice potential jurors; and that even if an order could be drafted,
information that fell in a grey area could still expose the jury pool to
prejudicial publicity. 107
V. THE HUNT COURT'S REASONING
In declining to issue an injunction against NBC's Billionaire Boys
Club, the district court relied upon Nebraska Press and two other key
cases: Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United States District Court,1°
("CBS") and Goldblum v. National Broadcasting Co. 109 ("Goldblum").
98. See infra section VI Establishing a Per Se Rule Against Prior Restraints.
99. Id.
100. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570. The Supreme Court acknowledged that in such a
small community (population 800), rumors could travel faster than the time it took to print the
newspapers. Id. at 567.
101. Id. at 569.
102. Id. at 563.
103. Id. at 565.
104. Id. at 567.
105. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 566.
106. See infra section VI(A) for discussion on obtaining proof of the effectiveness of a prior
restraint.
107. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 567.
108. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1983).
109. 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979).
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A. Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United States District Court:
Pretrial Publicity
In CBS, John DeLorean, a sports car manufacturer charged with
conspiracy to import cocaine, filed an application to restrain CBS from
broadcasting video tapes made by the government during its investiga-
tion of him. "0 The government joined DeLorean's application."' The
district court found that public dissemination of the video tapes would
irreparably harm DeLorean's right to a fair trial; therefore, the court
issued an order enjoining CBS from airing the tapes on its news broad-
casts."' On appeal, CBS contended that this prior restraint on the
broadcast violated its first amendment rights."
3
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit applied the Nebraska
Press test to this case.' While the district court concluded that
DeLorean met the three elements set forth in Nebraska Press,"' the
court of appeals disagreed, implying that the showing required by Ne-
braska Press was even more rigorous." 6
In CBS, the Ninth Circuit extended the Nebraska Press test, ex-
plaining that to assess the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity, courts
must look not only to the publicity's effect on each viewer individually,
but to the publicity's "capacity to inflame and prejudice the entire com-
munity." "' Thus, there are two relevant factors in evaluating the likely
impact of pretrial publicity upon a community: (1) the subject matter of
the case and (2) the composition of the community." 8 The CBS court
stated that whether the case facts would raise the level of emotion in the
community to unusual proportions and whether the size of the commu-
nity was small and rural, or populous, metropolitan and heterogeneous,
should be taken into account in determining whether to impose a prior
restraint. '9
To evaluate the Nebraska Press elements after CBS, the Ninth Cir-
cuit looks to the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity on the entire com-
munity. 20 The Ninth Circuit noted that when the Supreme Court




114. Id. at 1178.
115. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
116. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1178.
117. Id. at 1180. See also Hunt, 872 F.2d at 294.
118. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1180.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
overturns convictions based on pretrial publicity claims, the Court does
so because "'deep and bitter prejudice' [was] shown to be present
throughout the community."' 21 In CBS, the Ninth Circuit could not
find such sentiment.122 The court in CBS noted that the Central District
of California, where DeLorean was tried, is the most populous district in
the federal judicial system and that DeLorean was certain to find twelve
impartial jurors since the district's population was so diverse.123 The
Ninth Circuit also found that the charge against DeLorean, conspiracy
to import cocaine, was not a crime that would inflame public sentiment
against him.
124
In addition, the district court in CBS found that the alternatives to
prior restraint, such as voir dire and specific jury instructions, would not
mitigate the effects of publicity. 25 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that
the district court underestimated the effectiveness of these judicial meth-
ods in alleviating the.problems publicity presents.'
26
In applying the CBS principle to Hunt, the Ninth Circuit found that
Hunt failed to demonstrate that the NBC broadcast would inflame and
prejudice the entire San Mateo community. 127 In addition, while Hunt's
case may involve lurid or inflammatory subject matter, the court rea-
soned that San Mateo County is a populous, metropolitan and heteroge-
neous area where prejudicial publicity is less likely to endanger Hunt's
right to a fair trial. 121 Similarly, Hunt could not prove that, should he
secure a retrial in Los Angeles on the Levin charge, twelve unbiased ju-
rors could not be found.
129
121. Id. (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961)). See generally Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181, 191-93 (1952); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965); Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
122. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181. For examples of cases in which the subject matter of the case
itself caused such prejudice throughout the community, see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963) (defendant charged with armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (prominent doctor accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife to
death).
123. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1181-82.
124. Id. at 1181. The court noted that this indictment was similar to hundreds of others
before judges in California. Id.




129. Id. See People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 189-90, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976) cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (Los Angeles County, with a population of seven million in 1970,
was a heterogeneous, metropolitan area capable of supplying satisfactory jury panel for the
trial of Charles Manson for highly publicized crimes.).
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B. Goldblum v. National Broadcasting Co.: Prior Restraints Presumed
Unconstitutional
The Ninth Circuit cited their decision in Goldblum to emphasize its
strong stance against any sort of prior restraint. 130 Stanley Goldblum,
the former executive officer of the Equity Funding Corporation, was
serving a prison sentence for his role in the Equity Funding fraud when
he attempted to enjoin NBC's broadcast of the "Billion Dollar Bub-
ble." 13' Goldblum contended that the broadcast of the film would be an
inaccurate portrayal of the incident and of Goldblum's role in it.'32 The
inaccurate portrayal would inflame public opinion against him, jeopard-
ize his release on parole, infringe upon both his right to trial by an impar-
tial jury in any state or federal criminal action which might be brought
against him in the future, and also upon his right to a fair trial in a
pending civil case involving the demise of Equity Funding.
133
In Goldblum, the district court judge ordered NBC to produce the
film so that the court could view it for inaccuracies. 134 Counsel for NBC
was imprisoned on contempt of court charges when he refused to turn
over the film. 135 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the
district court's order to produce the film and reviewed whether the dis-
trict court had the power to order the film produced in the first place.
136
The Ninth Circuit stated, "The express and sole purpose of the district
court's order to submit the film for viewing by the court was to determine
whether or not to issue an injunction suspending its broadcast. Necessar-
ily, any such injunction would be a sweeping prior restraint of speech
and, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional."' 37 The court found that
Goldblum's injunction arguments of inaccuracy and possible inflamed
community opinion against him were "wholly speculative," and instead,
the court focused on the order to produce the film as if it were a prior
restraint. 138 The court stated:
It is a fundamental principle of the first amendment that the
press may not be required to justify or defend what it prints or
says until after the expression has taken place .... The district
130. See Goldblum, 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979); Hunt, 872 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1989).
131. Goldblum, 584 F.2d at 905.
132. Id. Apparently, if NBC wants to avoid the litigation involved in Hunt and Goldblum,
NBC should avoid titles with "Billion" in them.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 906.
135. Id.
136. Goldblum, 584 F.2d at 906-07.
137. Id. at 906.
138. Id. at 906-07.
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court proceedings here intervened in the editorial process by
ordering an official of the broadcasting company to produce a
film just before its scheduled broadcast so that it could be ex-
amined for inaccuracies. A procedure thus aimed toward pre-
publication censorship is an inherent threat to expression, one
that chills speech.139
With this opinion's strong stance against any sort of prior restraint, the
Ninth Circuit clarified that prior restraints will not be tolerated. Gold-
blum, however, failed to declare prior restraints unconstitutional per se,
as NBC urged the court to do in Hunt. "4
C. Alternatives to Prior Restraint
The Ninth Circuit stressed that Hunt did not meet his burden of
demonstrating element number two of the Nebraska Press test, that alter-
natives to prior restraint, such as voir dire, jury instructions, delay,
change of venue or jury sequestration, could not effectively protect his
rights to a fair trial; 4 nor had Hunt demonstrated element number
three of the test, that a prior restraint would sufficiently protect his
rights.142 The court reasoned that aside from the docudrama, substantial
publicity surrounding Hunt's trial and the Billionaire Boys Club had al-
ready reached the public.
4 3
VI. ESTABLISHING A PER SE RULE AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINTS
A. The Ultimate Conclusion
A per se rule against prior restraints should be declared so that the
interminable litigation arising from requests for prior restraints will end.
Remember, a prior restraint does not just effect the defendant; it also has
repercussions on the press, which is subjected to the restraining order,
and on millions of people who rely on the press for information. The
mere existence of the Nebraska Press test instead of a per se rule allows
defendants to believe that they can somehow obtain the proof required
and succeed in meeting the test. As the following discussion will show,
139. Id. at 907.
140. Brief of Appellee at 31, Hunt (No. 87-6625). NBC urged the court to declare prior
restraints unconstitutional in the fair trial context. Id. This per se rule therefore would be
applied to Goldblum's request but not to the district court judge's order to produce the film for
his viewing.
141. Hunt, 872 F.2d at 295-96.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 296. See, e.g., supra notes 12-50 and accompanying text.
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the test is unworkable and creates an absurdity that cannot ever be co-
herently solved because of the nature of the problem and proof required.
The three parts of the Nebraska Press test must add up to the ulti-
mate conclusion-that twelve impartial jurors cannot be found. Part one
of the test, that extensive publicity about the case exists, and part two,
showing that alternatives to prior restraint are ineffective to preserve fair
trial rights, are not as burdensome for the defendant to overcome as is
the third part of the Nebraska Press test.
In Hunt, the first prong of the test is passed simply because a movie
was made about the events. The producers were inspired to make the
movie because of the publicity; and precisely because the publicity has
generated public interest, the movie-makers hope that docudramas like
Billionaire Boys Club will score high ratings.'" The Billionaire Boys
Club does not merely portray Hunt, but also gives viewers a glimpse into
the lives of the rich and infamous. '45 The movie is only at its most enter-
taining if viewers are led to believe that Hunt is guilty.t46
Meeting the second prong-that there are viable alternatives to
prior restraint-is more difficult. Hunt could argue, for instance, that
change of venue, one alternative to prior restraint, would not protect his
fair trial rights since the docudrama was shown on national television,
and not just in a limited area. Still, Hunt would be hard-pressed to show
that extensive voir dire of the jury panel would not weed out the biased
jurors. Until Hunt failed to impanel a jury he has virtually no evidence
that a jury could not be impanelled.
The third prong of the test, that a prior restraint will protect the
defendant's rights, however, will always defeat any defendant requesting
a prior restraint. The third prong is the threshold constitutional inquiry,
for within the third prong lies the balance between the sixth amendment
right to a fair trial and the first amendment freedoms of speech and the
press. The third prong is the decisive factor: if a defendant proves that
only a prior restraint will protect his fair trial rights, the court will order
first amendment freedoms of speech and press temporarily mute. With-
out proof that a prior restraint would protect a defendant's fair trial
144. Incidentally, the docudrama won the A.C. Nielsen Co. ratings race when it was first
aired on Sunday night, November 8, 1987. The "Billionaire Boys Club" attracted 34% of the
viewers in the 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. time slot. Docudrama Wins the Ratings Race, L.A. Times,
Nov. 10, 1987, § 6, at 1.
145. For examples of the types of BBC members, see supra notes 13 & 17 and accompany-
ing text, and notes 50-52.
146. If the movie showed that it was more likely that Levin disappeared than was mur-
dered, the docudrama would not be as interesting. See supra note 52 regarding Levin's alleged
disappearance.
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rights, nevertheless, the Nebraska Press test cannot be met. Hunt would
have to prove that the movie contaminated the entire jury pool.
Hence, to prove a prior restraint would protect Hunt's right to an
impartial jury trial, the docudrama must be aired. Hunt must then prove
that everyone saw or discussed the movie, believed the docudrama's ver-
sion of the events and concluded that Hunt is guilty. In addition, every
potential juror needs to state that no matter what evidence was presented
to the contrary, they would believe Hunt's guilt. Further, the defendant
must prove that the docudrama was so influential that no potential juror
would take their civic duty seriously and consequently would ignore all
instructions from the judge.' 47 Only then, could a court conclude that
twelve impartial people cannot be found. Since this proof cannot be ob-
tained until after the broadcast of the movie, an injunction against NBC
would be useless.
To change the facts of Hunt for demonstrative purposes, suppose
Hunt showed that, because of the pretrial publicity, impanelling a jury
was impossible before the movie was aired. Even then, Hunt has no basis
for arguing that an injunction against NBC's docudrama would alleviate
any future harm to his fair trial rights. If Hunt could not obtain twelve
impartial jurors in the face of pretrial publicity, showing the docudrama
certainly could not add to the harm already done. Both these situations
put Hunt in a Catch-22.
Thus, the third prong becomes a per se condemnation of all fair trial
prior restraints. By attempting to enjoin the docudrama only, Hunt as-
sumes that television and print news coverage of his story was objective
and that the biased stance taken by the docudrama is instrumental in
interfering with his fair trial rights. 148 Undoubtedly, the Billionaire Boys
Club is a biased, one-sided movie.' 49 The docudrama distorts the facts so
much that the movie is fiction. Because the movie portrays real-life char-
acters, the movie has the appearance of truth. 5 ' In spite of the shoddy
aura this kind of movie projects, rather than interfering with Americans'
first amendment rights, methods other than prior restraint will protect
147. This is also a problem in trying to meet the second prong. See supra pp. 589-90 for
analysis of second prong.
148. Hunt stated that the injunction he was requesting was not a prior restraint of the press
since it would not interfere with NBC's right to broadcast news. "Defendants' fiction film is
more akin to... commercial speech, than to fact, and is therefore clearly distinguishable from
news, or 'press.'" Brief of Appellant Joe Hunt at 11, Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., 872
F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-6625).
149. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., supra notes 64 & 66-67 and accompanying text.
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the defendant. '5' If a court is willing to allow such a slanted docudrama
to air on national television, however, the courts should be forthright
about their position and declare a per se rule against prior restraints in
the fair trial context.
B. Prior Restraints in Fair Trial Context are Unnecessary
In Nebraska Press, the Court noted that "[i]t is significant that when
this Court has reversed a state conviction because of prejudicial public-
ity, it carefully noted that some course of action short of prior restraint
would have made a critical difference." '52 Referring to the Nebraska
Press decision, the Ninth Circuit considered the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements on alternatives to prior restraint and concluded that "there
may be no reason for courts to ever conclude that traditional methods
are inadequate and that the extraordinary remedy of prohibiting expres-
sion is required." '153 The alternative measures listed in Nebraska Press 154
have always been sufficient to protect a defendant's sixth amendment
rights. 55 If celebrity defendants such as Sirhan Sirhan, Charles Manson,
John DeLorean, Bob Haldeman and John Mitchell, among others,
1 56
could be fairly tried, then one can safely assume every defendant will
receive a fair trial despite pretrial publicity.'57 Since Nebraska Press,
state and federal appellate courts have consistently held that all trial
court restraints on pretrial publicity have failed to meet the requirements
set forth in Nebraska Press. 158 The Supreme Court has reserved judg-
ment on whether any defendant could meet the Nebraska Press test. 59
In view of the numerous safeguards protecting a defendant's fair
151. See infra section VI(B) Prior Restraints in Fair Trial Context are Unnecessary.
152. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 569.
153. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1183.
154. See supra note 94.
155. In re CBS, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. La. 1983) app. dism. sub nom. United
States v. McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1984).
156. Not to mention Zsa Zsa Gabor.
157. See People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d
584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252
(D.C.Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nornm Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174
(9th Cir. 1983). In the first four cases the courts rejected the claim of prejudicial publicity. See
also discussion of CBS, supra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
158. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1178. See, e.g., In re CBS, 697 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1983); Arkansas
Gazette Co. v. Lofton, 269 Ark. 109, 598 S.W.2d 745 (1980); Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976).
159. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 569-70.
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trial rights, no situation exists, and probably will not exist in the future,
that prevents a defendant from receiving a fair trial despite the publicity.
A prior restraint is not only a measure of last resort, but a measure which
should not require application. Imagine the unimaginable: pretrial pub-
licity prevents a defendant from obtaining a fair trial, and the alternatives
to prior restraint prove insufficient." 6 The defendant essentially could
not be fairly tried at all. The defendant would have to go free. Is it not
better to allow one defendant to go free rather than to jeopardize the
trust that millions have in the press? While first amendment rights
should not be balanced against sixth amendment fair trial rights, only
rare circumstances will render these rights incompatible.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court stated that "[tihe thread running through all
these cases is that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights ....
A prior restraint . . . by definition, has an immediate and irreversible
sanction." 6 ' The Court also remarked that "[a]ny prior restraint on ex-
pression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its con-
stitutional validity." '62 Still, the Supreme Court is undecided about prior
restraints. The Court has not declared prior restraints per se unconstitu-
tional, nor has the Court indicated under what circumstances prior re-
straints may be valid. 63 Despite its definitional vagueness, the Supreme
Court has never held that first amendment rights are absolute or that
prior restraints can never be imposed. 6"
The inability of defendants to meet the demands of Nebraska Press,
160. See supra section VI(A) entitled The Ultimate Conclusion. Hunt would ultimately be
proving that he could never be fairly tried.
161. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559.
162. Id. at 558 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-20
(1971)).
163. Even when the Court has reversed a state criminal conviction because of prejudicial
publicity, it has carefully noted that a course of action other than a prior restraint would have
been a necessary precaution. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 569. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-51 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723, 726 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
164. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570. The Court noted that there are exceptional times
when prior restraints can be imposed. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). When a
nation is at war, it is proper to impose restrictions on publications that would block the re-
cruitment of troops or those that would reveal information about the size, location, and move-
ment of troops. In addition, obscenity can be restricted as well as information that would
incite acts of violence or the overthrow of orderly government by force. Id. These exceptions




however, has led many commentators to conclude that, as a practical
matter, the decision bars all prior restraints on reporting judicial pro-
ceedings.' 65 In addition, the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall and Stewart in Nebraska Press, emphasizes
the belief that prior restraints are never permissible in the fair trial con-
text. 166 Justice White did not set forth a per se rule there, but did state in
his concurring opinion, "If the recurring result, however, in case after
case is to be similar to our judgment today, we should at some point
announce a more general rule and avoid the interminable litigation that
our failure to do so would necessarily entail."'
' 67
The time has arrived for the Supreme Court to announce such a
rule. Prior restraints can restrain protected speech as well as unprotected
speech because prior restraints are imposed before a determination is
made as to whether the speech is protected by the first amendment.
1 68
Thus, when the media faces a prior restraint the collateral bar rule
169
poses a dilemma: whether to disobey the prior restraint and risk criminal
contempt or suffer the violation of first amendment rights. 7°
Hunt could have been spared his appeal had the Ninth Circuit or
the Supreme Court declared prior restraints unconstitutional per se.
Certainly, other cases like Hunt will arise. Television remains the perfect
place to exploit the defendants, as well as the victims of crimes. 17  True-
to-life drama is becoming increasingly prevalent in the television media;
technological advances in the film and television industries allow these
movies to be produced quickly and aired shortly thereafter. 172 Instead of
165. CBS, 729 F.2d at 1178 n.4. See, e.g., Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Shep-
pard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29
STAN. L. REV. 393, 409 n.72 (1977); Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Have
We Seen the Last of Prior Restraints on the Reporting of Judicial Proceedings? 20 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 654 (1976); Younger, Some Thoughts on the Defense of Publicity Cases, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1977).
166. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 572-73.
167. Id. at 571.
168. See supra note 77.
169. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
170. Brief of Appellee at 36, Hunt, (No. 87-6625). See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (upholding contempt citations imposed on petitioners, even though
injunction was found unconstitutional).
171. ABC, for instance, aired "The Preppie Murder" on September 24, 1989. The story
centers on prep school graduate Robert Chambers who kills his well-to-do girlfriend Jennifer
Levin in New York's Central Park. Based on a true story, this film is another example of
television's interest in criminal defendants such as Joe Hunt. Rosenberg, "Preppie Murder"
Drama Pleads Case for Victims, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1989, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
172. See e.g., Baker, Writers and Agents: The Rush to Cash In, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1990,
at 20. Within days after the suicide death of Boston murder suspect Charles Stuart, a producer
announced plans to make a television movie which will be aired on CBS later in 1990. Id.
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prior restraints, defendants' fair trial rights can be protected by other
methods.' 73 In the past, alternatives to prior restraint have protected
both a defendant's right to a fair trial and the first amendment rights of
millions of Americans. These methods can continue to sufficiently guard
first and sixth amendment rights in the future.
Lisa Karen Garner*
173. See supra note 94 on alternatives to prior restraint.
* The Author thanks the following people for their assistance: Lisa Agrusa, Mary Dev-
ereaux, Debbie Levine, Prof. Christopher May, Karen Poston, Dennis Yokoyama, and Cherise
Wolas.
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